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McFarlane: Copyright Law and the Internet

ARTICLE
THE NINTH CIRCUIT LANDS A
"PERFECT 10" APPLYING COPYRIGHT
LAW TO THE INTERNET
ROBERT A. MCFARLANE·

INTRODUCTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued three landmark
decisions in 2007 that addressed how copyright protections apply to
images that can be accessed over the Internet. Internet publisher Perfect
10 initiated these lawsuits based on allegations that its registered
copyrights were infringed when unauthorized copies of its photographs
appeared on third-party websites where they could be viewed,
downloaded, and purchased without payment to Perfect 10. I
Due at least in part to the alleged difficulty of bringing
infringement suits against the individuals who it believed were directly
infringing its copyrights by downloading unauthorized copies, 2 Perfect
* Mr. McFarlane is a litigation partner in the San Francisco office of Townsend and
Townsend and Crew LLP who specializes in patent litigation, intellectual property disputes and
counseling, and software performance and complex commercial matters. He received his J.D. from
the University of California Hastings College of the Law in 1994 and his B.A.S. in Industrial
Engineering and Political Science from Stanford University in 1990.
I Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v.
Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th
Cir. 2007).
2 See, e.g., MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005) ("When a widely
shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in
the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or
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10 sought to recover damages for direct and indirect copyright
infringement from entities responsible for aspects of the Internet that,
when linked together across the world wide web, allegedly contributed to
or facilitated the infringing transactions? Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com
reviewed Perfect 1O's request for a preliminary injunction based
primarily on its claim that co-defendant Google directly and indirectly
infringed its copyrights. 4 Specifically, Perfect 10 alleged that Google,
among other things, operated a search engine that indexed its
copyrighted images, stored low-resolution "thumbnail" versions of the
images on its servers, facilitated the display of those images on users'
computer screens, and provided programming instructions that informed
users' web browser software how to access full size versions of the
infringing images through the Internet. 5 Perfect 10 v. Visa International
Service Ass'n, reviewed Perfect 1O's attempt to impose liability for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against financial
institutions that process credit card payments to websites that allegedly
profited by selling unauthorized copies of Perfect 10' s copyrighted
images. 6 Finally, Perfect 10 v. CC Bill Inc. reviewed an attempt to
impose liability for, among other things, providing web hosting and
related Internet connectivity services to the owners of infringing
websites, and provided the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to clarify several
of the safe harbor and notice provisions contained in the Digital
Millennial Copyright Act (DMCA).7
Since the United States Constitution enshrined the protection of
copyright in this country,8 courts have been faced with the difficulties of
applying copyright law to ever-evolving technologies that did not exist
vicarious infringement."). See also Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 823 «Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) Noting that "[itl would certainly be much easier" if Perfect 10 were suing the companies
selling unauthorized copies of its images over the internet. "No doubt, they would if they could.
But direct infringers are sometimes too ubiquitous, too small or too difficult to findFalse Here,
plaintiff alleges that many direct infringers have no physical presence in the United States. They
operate from far-off jurisdictions, where lawsuits are difficult to bring and remedies impossible to
enforce because the infringers can easily move their operations to servers in other remote
jurisdictions.").
3 Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1146; Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n,
494 F.3d at 788; Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1102.
4 The allegations against Amazon.com were based in large measure on Amazon.com's
display of search results and "thumbnail" images generated by Google. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 508 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007) Perfect 10 initially brought separate cases against Amazon.com
and Google. However the cases were consolidated by the district court. See Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157.
5 1d. at 1155-56.
6 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 793.
7 Perfect 10 v. CC BILL LLC, 488 F.3d at 1102.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss3/3

2

McFarlane: Copyright Law and the Internet

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE INTERNET

2008]

383

when the applicable statutes were enacted. The trilogy of published
Ninth Circuit decisions arising from Perfect lO's copyright actions
represents an important and potentially far-reaching development in the
application of copyright laws to new technologies of the Internet and an
analysis of the policy goals underlying copyright law as applied to the
internet. This Article briefly summarizes the facts of these three cases,
explains the central holdings of each decision, and then concludes with a
discussion of the collective impact that the three decisions have on
enforcement of copyrights in the Internet context and the policy reasons
supporting the court's decisions.
I.

PERFECT 10' S ATTEMPT TO IMpOSE LIABILITY ON GOOGLE AND
AMAZON. COM FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISPLAY AND PUBLICATION OF
ITS COPYRIGHTED IMAGES

Perfect 10 marketed and sold copyrighted images of nude models
through an eponymous adult magazine and a subscription website. 9
Perfect 10 asserted that it had invested $36 million to develop its brand,
including $12 million to create the photographic images, and that it
generated virtually all of its revenue from sales of its print magazine and
the monthly subscription charge that allowed paying customers to access
the copyrighted images through a password-protected "members only"
portion of its website. 1O Perfect 10 also derived a small portion of its
revenue from a licensing agreement that provided for the worldwide sale
and distribution of reduced size images for use on cell phones. II The
underlying basis of Perfect 10' s complaints in Peifect 10 v. Amazon. com,
Peifect 10 v. Visa Int'l Service Ass 'n, and Peifect 10 v. CC Bill centered
around the unauthorized duplication, access, and sale of its copyrighted
images through web sites that provided no payments to Perfect 10. 12
A.

GOOGLE'S SEARCH ENGINE AND THE ACCESS OF IMAGES OVER THE
INTERNET

The Ninth Circuit's decision provided an informative description
of operations that locate, store, access, and display images across the

9 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828, 831-32 (C.D.Cal. 2006), affd in part rev'd
in part and remanded, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).

10 [d.
II

[d.

12 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. Visa In!,1
Serv Ass'n" 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.
2007).
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Internet and, therefore, that are critical to its analysis of Google's
potential liability for infringing copyrights in such images. The court
explained that the "Internet is a world-wide network ... [of computers]
all sharing a common communications technology.,,13 Information
stored on individual computers can be provided to other computers
connected to the Internet via web pages, which consist of text
interspersed with instructions in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).14
Significantly for the court's analysis, images are not stored on web
pages. Instead, web pages contain instructions in HTML that provide
addresses identifying the network locations where images are stored. 15
Generally, web pages are publicly available through the Internet and can
be accessed by computer users through the Internet using a web
browser. 16
Google's search engine is a software program that automatically
accesses thousands of websites, which are collections of individual web
pages, and indexes them in a database maintained on Google's
computers. 17 When locating images, Google's search engine does not
recognize images, but identifies text in the Google database responsive to
the user's query and provides reduced-size, lower-resolution versions of
the images called "thumbnails.,,18 Google stores these thumbnails on its
servers, but does not store copies of the full-sized images. 19 Instead,
Google provides instructions in HTML that allow a user's web browser
to locate and download them from other, third-party computers
connected through the Internet. 20 Thus, although the thumbnail and fullsize image may appear on the user's screen to consist of a single
integrated presentation, the two images actually come from two different
sources: Google's server in the case of the thumbnail, and a third-party
website in the case of the full-sized image. 21
The process of
incorporating these images into a single window is called "in-line
linking," and the process allowing information from one computer to
frame and annotate the in-line linked content from another computer is

13

Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155.

14/d.
15/d.

1d. Microsoft's Internet Explorer is an example of a web-browser. See, e.g., MICROSOFT
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 243-44, 479 (4th ed. 1999).
17
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155.
18
1d .
19
1d .
16

20

See ld.

21

ld. at 1155-56.
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called "framing.,,22 Google also stores web page text in a "cache," a
form of memory with short access time which stores frequently used
instructions or data. 23
Google also generated revenue through an arrangement with
Amazon.com through which Amazon.com in-line linked to Google
search results, allowing Amazon.com to provide search results generated
by Google on its web pages. 24 Finally, Google generated revenue
through a program called "Ad Sense," wherein website owners could
register with Google, place HTML instructions on their web pages, and
allow Google's algorithms to automatically select relevant
advertisements to be displayed when the website is accessed. 25 The Ad
Sense "partners" and Google would then share revenue generated by the
advertisement. 26
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT LARGELY REJECTED PERFECT lO's THEORIES
THAT GOOGLE DIRECTLY INFRINGED ITS COPYRIGHTS

Peifect 10 v. Amazon.com provided a succinct primer in the law
of direct and indirect copyright infringement and then applied those
principles to the Internet. To present a prima facie case of direct
copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show that it owns the allegedly
infringed material and that the infringer has violated at least one of the
exclusive rights granted under 17 U.S.c. § 106, namely, the rights to
reproduce, distribute, and publicly display the copyrighted work.27 Since
Perfect 10' s ownership of at least some of the images at issue was not
disputed, the opinion focused on allegations that Perfect lO's exclusive
rights were being infringed. 28
The Ninth Circuit applied the basic definitions set forth in the
Copyright Act and the novel "server test" originally devised by the
district court to determine whether Perfect 10 had established a prima
facie case that Google directly infringed its copyrights. 29 For purposes of
the Copyright Act, to "display" an image means "to show a copy of it,
either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other

1d.
ld. at 1156. Significantly, Google's cache includes text only; it does not include images
from third-party web pages. Id. (emphasis added).
24 ld .
25 ld .
26 ld.
22
23

Id. at 1159 (citations omitted).
ld.
29 Id. at 1159-62.

27

28
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device or process," wherein a "copy" is a "material object [], ... in which
a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, ... " and wherein "[a] work is fixed in a tangible medium
of expression when its embodiment ... is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period more than transitory duration. ,,30 As used in this definition, a
photographic image is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression in the
context of computers when it is "embodied (i.e., stored) in a computer's
server (or hard disk, or other storage device)," and the digitally stored
image is considered a "copy" as defined under the Copyright Act. 31
Applying these definitions, computer users "display" a "copy" of a
photographic image when their computer fills its screen with a copy of
the image as it is stored, or "fixed" in the computer's memory.32 Thus,
the court's analysis of whether Google directly infringed Perfect 10' s
display right turned largely on whether the image displayed on the user's
computer screen was stored on Google's servers, an analysis christened
"the server test.,,33 Applying this criteria, the court found that Perfect 10
had not established a prima facie case of direct infringement based on
Google's process of in-line linking full-sized images from third-party
websites or its storage of web page text in its cache for the simple reason
that the copyrighted image displayed on a user's computer screen was
never stored on Google's servers. Rather, Google simply provided
HTML instructions through which images stored on third-party
computers were located and accessed. 34 The court found that providing
these instructions was not equivalent to "displaying" a "copy" of the
image and, therefore, Google did not directly infringe Perfect lO's
copyrights through these two activities. 35
Applying the server test, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion when Google's thumbnail images were displayed on a user's
computer and found that Perfect 10 had, in fact, established a prima facie
10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160 (citing 17 U.S.C. §101).
Id. (citing MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 -18 (9th Cir. 1993».
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160.
33/d. at 1159, 1161.
34 /d. at 1160-62.
35 Id. at 1161 (also noting that the assistance provided by Google gave rise only to issues of
contributory liability). The court found that Perfect 10 would not likely prevail on its theory that
Google directly infringed its exclusive right to distribute full-size copies of its copyrighted images
for the same reason. Since Google's search engine provided HTML instructions to the end user's
browser that identified the location of an image, but did not "distribute" a "copy" of the image that
was stored on Google's own servers as required to show infringement of this exclusive right there
was no infringement. /d. at 1160.
30 Perfect

31
32
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case of direct infringement in this instance because such images were
stored on Google's servers. 36 Thus, when the user viewed a copy of the
image on his or her computer screen, it represented the display of a copy
that was fIxed in a tangible medium on Google's servers, and, therefore,
represented potential direct infringement. 37
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROVED GOOGLE'S FAIR USE DEFENSE

Having found that Perfect 10 had established a prima facie case of
direct infringement based on Google's use of thumbnail images, the
court went on to fInd that Google would likely prevail on its fair use
defense, and, consequently, vacated the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court that otherwise prohibited Google from creating and
publicly displaying thumbnail versions of Perfect 10' s images. 38 The fair
use defense, which is codifIed at 17 U.S.C. § 107, "permits the use of
copyrighted works without the copyright owner's consent under certain
situations," including "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research ... ,,39 In evaluating a fair use defense the court must weigh four
factors:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.40

The fair use defense requires a case-by-case analysis in which the court
is to explore each of the factors, weigh them together in light of the
purpose of copyright law as set forth in the United States Constitution "to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts,'.41 and to serve "the

,d. at 1160.
,d.
38 ,d. at 1154, 1168-1169. The court also reversed the district court regarding the burden of
proof on this defense. The court held that, since Perfect 10 had shown a likelihood of success on the
merits of its direct infringement claim, the burden shifted to Google to establish a likelihood that the
affirmative defense would be successful. Id. at 1158.
39 ,d. at 1163.
40 17 U.S.c. §107.
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, c1. 8.
36
37
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welfare of the public.,,42 Additionally, as dictated by federal statute, "the
fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.,,43
The Ninth Circuit first considered the "purpose and character" of
Google's use of thumbnail images, concluding that it was "highly
transformative," and concluding that the first factor weighted heavily in
Google's favor. 44 The "central purpose" of the analysis under this factor
is to "determine whether and to what extent the new work is
'transformative.',,45 A work is transformative when it "does not 'merely
supersede the objects of the original creation,' but rather 'adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.",46 Conversely, a new work is
likely not transformative and, therefore, not likely a "fair use" if it
"supersede[s] the use of the original.,,47
The court's conclusion that the thumbnails were highly
trans formative was based on several factors. First, Google's thumbnail
images served a different function than the originals. 48 "Although an
image may have been originally created to serve an entertainment,
aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image
into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.,,49 Moreover,
the "search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original
work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool," which
places the images "into a different context" so that they are "transformed
into a new creation.,,5o Additionally, the court rejected Perfect 1O's
argument that Google's use of thumbnail images was not transformative
because such images superseded Perfect 1O's right to sell reduced-size
images for use in cell phones and because Google's use of the images
was commercial in nature. Following the Supreme Court's directive to

42 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1163 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 n.l 0, (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-2222,.at 7 (1909)).
43 17 U.S.C. §107.
44

45

Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164-66.
1d. at 1164 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, at 579 (1994)).

Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1164 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1985)).
48 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1165. See also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that thumbnail images generated by a search engine are
transformative because they served a different function than the originals, namely improving access
to information rather than artistic expression (emphasis added)).
49
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1165.
50 1d. (citing Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir.
2006)).
46

47
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weigh "the extent to which a use promotes the purposes of copyright and
serves the interests of the public,,,51 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
"significantly transformative nature of Google's search engine" heavily
outweighed "any incidental superseding use or minor commercial aspects
of Google's search engine and website," and that the purpose and
character of Google's use weighed heavily in favor of finding it was a
"fair use. ,,52
The Ninth Circuit further found that the district court did not err
in ruling that the second factor regarding the nature of the copyrighted
work weighed slightly in favor of Perfect 10 and that the third factor
regarding the amount and substantiality of the portion used favored
neither party.53 Finally, the court concluded that the fourth factor, the
effect of the use on the market, favored neither party.54 The court
reasoned, as it had in Kelly, that Google's use of thumbnails did not hurt
Perfect lO's marketing of full-sized images and, further, that any harm to
Perfect 10' s market in reduced-size images for cell phones was
hypothetica1. 55 The court concluded that
Google has put Perfect IO's thumbnail images (along with millions of
other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use
intended by Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a significant
benefit to the public. Weighing this significant transformative use
against the unproven use of Google's thumbnails for cell phone
downloads, and considering the other fair use factors, all in light of the
purpose of copyright, we conclude that Google's use of Perfect lO's
th urnbnm'1'
s IS a f'
au use. 56

Having so concluded, the Ninth Circuit found that Google would
likely succeed in proving its fair use defense and vacated the district

51 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1166 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v, Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,431-32 (1984)).
52
See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1166-67.
53 See Id. at 1167-68. The court minimized application of the second factor by stating that,
although the images were '''creative in nature', and thus 'closer to the core of intended copyright
protection,'" they were previously published and not entitled to the enhanced protection available
prior to first publication. Id. at 1167 (relying on Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 82 I).
Additionally, the court relied on the conclusion in Kelly v. Ariba Soft that the use of an entire image
within a thumbnail was reasonable in light of the purpose to allow users to recognize the image and
decide whether to pursue more information about it or the originating website. Id. (citing Kelly, 336
F.3d at 821).
54
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1168.
55 1d.
56 1d.
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court's preliminary injunction against Google's use of thumbnail
.
57
unages.
D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT REMANDED FOR FURTHER FACT FINDING
REGARDING PERFECT lO's CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT CLAlM
BUT REJECTED ITS CLAlM FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Perfect 10' s allegations that Google should be held liable under
theories of contributory and vicarious infringement provided the Ninth
Circuit with the opportunity to address fundamental issues affecting the
potential liability for major Internet companies based on the acts of
individuals who use their services. The court's analysis is particularly
significant because it interprets the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 58 as it applies to
the novel issues before the court.
Under the rule enunciated in Grokster, a company may be held
liable for contributory copyright infringement if it "intentionally
induc[es] or encourage[es] direct infringement," and for vicarious
infringement if it "profit[s] from direct infringement while declining to
exercise a right to stop or limit it.,,59 Since the litigants did not dispute
that third-parties directly infringed Perfect 10' s copyrights by
reproducing, displaying and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect
10' s copyrighted images through the Internet,60 the court reviewed
Google's potential liability for secondary infringement under both
contributory and vicarious liability theories.
Under long-standing case law, "one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer.,,61 The Ninth Circuit further refined this rule as it applies to
1d.
58 545 U.s. 913 (2005).
59 1d. at 930 (internal citations omitted). See also Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv Assoc., 494
F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) ("a defendant is a contributory infringer if it (I) has knowledge of a
third party's infringing activity, and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct." (citations omitted)); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding contributory liability in an internet context where the defendant had engaged "in
personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement").
60 Perfect IO v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1170.
61 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2nd Cir. 1971). See also Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1171 (finding that the rule set fort
in Gershwin is consistent with the Supreme Court's Grokster decision). The court explained this
rule at some length in Perfect IO v. Visa International Servo Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 794-95.
Contributory copyright infringement is based on the tort concepts of enterprise liability and imputed
intent. /d. at 794-95. And, although the test has been formulated in various ways, the basic test is
57
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cyberspace in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. by holding that "if a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available
on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement. ,,62
Applying the law as stated in Gershwin, Grokster, and Napster,
the Ninth Circuit found it necessary to remand the issue of Google's
potential contributory infringement for further fact finding by the district
court. 63 The parties did not dispute that Google's search engine
substantially assists websites owners in distributing infringing copies of
Perfect 10' s copyrighted images or that it assists users in accessing
infringing materials. 64 Thus, "Google could be held contributorily liable
if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available
using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further
damage to Perfect 10' s copyrighted works, and failed to take such
steps.,,65 The district court did not resolve factual disputes regarding the
adequacy of Perfect 10' s notice of infringement to Google, the adequacy
of Google's responses to such notice, or the availability to Google of
reasonable and feasible means to halt the direct infringement using its
search engine. 66 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue for
the district court to decide whether "Perfect 10 would likely succeed in
establishing that Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to
full-size infringing images ... ,,67
The Ninth Circuit did not look favorably on Perfect lO's claim
that Google could be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement.
Under Grokster, a claim for vicarious infringement can succeed only if
the plaintiff demonstrates that "the defendant exercises the requisite
control over the direct infringer and that the defendant derives a direct
financial benefit from the direct infringement. ,,68 A defendant is
that one contributorily infringes when he (I) has knowledge of another's infringement and (2) either
(a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement. Id. at 795.
62 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 FJd 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
63 Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 FJd 1146 at 1172-73.
64 ld. at 1172.
65 1d. at 1172 (emphasis added).
66 ld . at 1173.
67 1d. at 1172-73.
68 Id. (citing MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). The court further
explained this standard in Perfect 10 v. Visa International Servo Ass'n., 494 F.3d at 802:
Whereas contributory infringement is based on tort-law principles of enterprise liability and
imputed intent, vicarious infringement's roots lie in the agency principles of respondeat
superior. To state a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant has (I) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct
financial interest in the infringing activity.... one infringes vicariously by profiting from
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.
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considered to have such control over a direct infringer only when it has
"a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct," and "the
practical ability to do so. ,,69 The court found that Perfect 10 failed to
demonstrate Google had either. First, Perfect 10 failed to demonstrate a
likelihood that Google had the legal right to stop or limit the direct
infringement by third-parties. 70 Second, the district court found that
Google did not have the practical ability to police potential infringement
of third-party web sites identified through its search engine. 71
Specifically, Google's software did not have the "ability to analyze every
image in [the I]nternet, compare each image to all the other copyrighted
images that exist in the world ... and determine whether a certain image
on the web infringes someone' s copyright." 72 Thus, the court concluded
that Perfect 10 was not likely to establish the "control prong" necessary
for imposing vicarious liability.73
II.

PERFECT lO'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO "FOLLLOW THE MONEY" AND
HOLD FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LIABLE FOR SECONDARY
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BASED ON PAYMENTS MADE TO
ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING WEBSITES

Due to the alleged difficulty of suing the individuals that it
believed were directly infringing its copyrights,74 Perfect 10 sued a host
of financial institutions, including Visa and Mastercard, that processed
charges incurred by customers who acquired the infringing images from

Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, at 1173 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1173-74.
71 Id. at 1174.
72 Id. (citing Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d at 858).
73 Perfect JO v. Amazon.com, at 1174. The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed two additional
issues in its decision. First, the district court had not reached the issue of whether Perfect 10' s
notices of infringement to Google were sufficient under the DMCA, because it determined Perfect
10 was unlikely to demonstrate liability for either contributory or vicarious liability. The remand
included an instruction that the court consider whether Google was likel y to demonstrate it was
entitled to the limitations on injunctive relief provided by the safe harbor provisions in title II of the
DMCA. Id. at 1175-76.
Finally, the court remanded certain of Perfect lO's claims against Amazon.com for the court to
consider potential contributory liability, as well as possible limitations on the scope of injunctive
relief in light of the legal conclusions it reached in analyzing the allegations as to Google. !d. at
1175-76. Additionally, the court agreed that Perfect 10 was not likely to prevail on its claims that
Amazon.com directly infringed its copyrights for reasons similar to those detailed in its analysis of
the claim against Google. See Id.
74
See supra, note 2.
fB

70

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss3/3

12

McFarlane: Copyright Law and the Internet

COPYRIGHT LA WAND THE INTERNET

2008]

393

third-party websites. 75 The Ninth Circuit believed a finding that "the
Defendants' activities fall within the scope of [indirect copyright
infringement] would require a radical and inappropriate expansion of
existing principles of secondary liability and would violate the public
policy of the United States.,,76 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
dismissal with prejudice of Perfect lO's causes of action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).77
A.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR CONTRIBUTORY
INFRINGEMENT

The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected Perfect lO's claim that the
financial institution defendants could be held liable for contributory
infringement on the grounds that they allegedly continued to process
credit card payments to the infringing web sites after being informed of
the infringing activity.78 First, the court found that the financial
institutions simply did not materially contribute to the alleged
infringement such that liability could be assessed:
The credit card companies cannot be said to materially contribute to
the infringement in this case because they have no direct connection to
that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction,
alteration, display, and distribution of Perfect 10' s images over the
Internet. Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material passes
over Defendants' payment networks or through their payment
processing systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or
79
display the infringing images.

In reaching its conclusion, the majority distinguished the recent
holding of Peifect 10 v. Amazon. com. The court started with the
conclusion in Amazon.com that "Google could be held contributorily
liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent
further damage to Perfect 10' s copyrighted works, and failed to take such
steps. ,,80 The majority found the salient distinction was that "Google's
Perfect JO v. Visa Int'! Servo Ass'n., at 794.
!d. at 795.
77 Id. at 792.
78 Id. at 796.
79 1d. at 796.
75

76

80

Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'!

Serve Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v.

Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 70 I, 729 (9th Cir. 2007).
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search engine itself assists in the distribution of infringing content to
Internet users, while defendants' payment systems do not.,,81 Indeed, the
most that could be said of the defendants' payment system was that it
made it easier for the infringement to be profitable; the infringement
could still occur without using the defendants' systems, and there were
other viable funding mechanisms available. 82 Moreover, the court noted
that the Amazon. com decision reasoned that "Google substantially assists
websites to distribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market and
assists a worldwide audience of users to access infringing materials.,,83
However, in the Visa case, the defendants did not provide an analogous
service and, moreover, their activity was even further removed from the
act of direct infringement than the conduct at issue in Amazon. com:
[Defendants] in no way assist or enable Internet users to locate
infringing material, and they do not distribute it. They do, as alleged,
make infringement more profitable, and people are generally more
inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable.
However, there is an additional step in the causal chain: Google may
materially contribute to infringement by making it fast and easy for
third parties to locate and distribute infringing material, whereas
Defendants make it easier for infringement to be profitable, which
tends to increase financial incentives to infringe, which in tum tends to
increase infringement. 84

Consequently, the majority did not believe Amazon.com mandated a
finding that the credit card companies and others who processed the
payments at issue could be held contributorily liable.
The court also distinguished two of its earlier cases finding
liability for contributory infringement, Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc.,85 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 86 The Fonovisa court
found a flea market proprietor was liable for contributory copyright
infringement predicated on infringing sales taking place at the swap meet
it operated. In this case, the proprietor provided the extensive support
that facilitated the infringement, namely the "space, utilities, parking,
advertisement, plumbing and customers," which the court designated the
Perfect 10 v. Visa In"l Serve Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797.
Id. at 797 -98.
83 Id. at 797.

81

82

84

/d.

76 F.3d 259 (9th CiT. 1996).
239 F.3d 1004 (9th CiT. 2001). Judge Kozinski's dissent asserted these and other
distinctions in the majority's analysis were "ephemeral" at best. See Perfect 10 v. Visa In"l Serv
Ass 'n, 494 F.3d at 825 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
85

86
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"site and facilities" for the sale of pirated works. 87 Similarly, the
landmark Internet case Napster found the designer and distributor of a
file sharing program liable for contributory infringement, because its
program was expressly engineered to enable easy exchange of pirated
music and was widely used for such purposes. 88 The majority in the Visa
case found that in both of these earlier cases, the defendant "increased
the level of infringement by providing a centralized place, whether
physical or virtual, where infringing works could be collected, sorted,
found, and bought, sold, or exchanged.,,89 In contrast, Visa and the other
financial institution defendants "do no such thing;" they did not operate
the "site" of the infringement, i.e., the websites where the infringing
works were available, nor did they create, operate, advertise, or
otherwise promote these websites. 90 Additionally, unlike Napster, the
defendants do not "provide users the tools to locate infringing material,"
or operate any network or computer storing or transmitting the infringing
material. 91 Simply put, the defendants "merely provide a method of
payment, not a 'site' or 'facility' of infringement," and the majority
found that operating such a payment system was insufficient basis to
impose contributory liability. 92
B.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR INDUCING INFRINGEMENT

The court also readily disposed of Perfect lO's claim for
inducement. Following Grokster, "one who distributes a device [or
offers a service] with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties.'.93 "Mere knowledge of infringing potential or actual
infringing uses" is insufficient to establish this form of liability, and it is
crucial for the plaintiff to establish that the alleged inducer
87 76 F.3d at 264. Additionally, the Court found in Fonavisa that the primary infringers and
the swap meet owner were engaged in a mutual enterprise and that "it would be difficult for the
infringing activity to take place in the massive quantity alleged without the support services provided
by the swap meet." Id. The proprietor's culpability was also heightened because it failed to provide
the country sheriff with information intended to discourage counterfeit sales following a raid at the
swap meet in which 38,000 counterfeit recordings were seized. Id. at 261, 264.
88 A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020, n.5, and 1022.
89 Perfect !O v. Visa Int'[ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 799.
90 Id. at 799-800.
91 Id. at 800.
92 See Id. ("While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for web sites to profit
from this infringing activity, the infringement stems from the failure to obtain a license to distribute,
not the processing of payments.").
93 1d. at 800 (quoting MGM Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)).
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":communicated an inducing message to their users[, for example] an
advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to
stimulate others to commit violations.,,94
In sum, where an article is good for nothing else but infringement,
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and
there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.
Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an
item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits
liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding
that some of one's products will be misused. It leaves breathing room
l"
•
lor mnovatlOn
an d'
VIgorous commerce. 95

The majority had little difficulty finding the defendants were not
liable under this standard because Perfect 10 alleged no affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, there were no facts suggesting defendants
promoted their payment system as a means to infringe copyright, and
defendants marketed credit cards as a means to pay for goods and
services, rather than as a means to thwart copyright laws as in the
Napster case. 96 Finally, the court held that Perfect 10' s allegation that
the defendants allowed their names and logos to be displayed on the
allegedly infringing sites fell short of a "clear expression" of a specific
intent to foster infringement. 97
C.

DEFENDANTS WERE NOT LIABLE FOR VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT

Finally, the Ninth Circuit majority rejected Perfect 10' s claim
based on vicarious copyright infringement. As discussed above, a claim
for vicarious infringement must include allegations that the defendant
has both a financial interest in the infringing activity and the right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity.98 Perfect 10 based its claim
on defendants' rules that required member banks to terminate a
merchant's participation in their payment networks if they engaged in
certain illegal activity, and thus, it argued, defendants had it within their
power to stop processing payments to infringing sites. 99
Relying on the analysis of Perfect 10 v. Amazon. com, the court
Perfect IO v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 800. (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937).
Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 801 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. 932-33).
96 Perfect IO v. Visa Int'/ Serv Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 800, 801.
97 /d. at 802.
98 See supra notes 57 to 72 and accompanying text, Part n.D.
99 /d. at 802-03.
94

95
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found that the ability to terminate payments fell short of giving the
defendants the requisite right to control the infringing activity.)OO
Moreover, even if defendants withdrew their payment mechanism, "an
infringing third-party website can continue to reproduce, display, and
distribute its infringing copies of the [copyrighted] images ... " 10)
Consequently, defendants' rules only gave them the ability to indirectly
influence the infringing activity to some degree, and did not provide the
direct control required to find vicarious liability. Finally, the majority
emphatically concluded that finding vicarious liability on the facts before
it represented a "radical step we do not take.,,102

III. CC BILL AND THE NINTH ClRCUIT' S INTERPRETATION OF THE
DMCA SAFE HARBOR AND NOTICE PROVISIONS
Communications technology has long created challenges in
determining the appropriate scope of copyright protections. Prior to the
rise of the Internet, Congress adopted a "passive carrier" exemption that
released parties such as telephone companies from liability for copyright
infringement when their "activities with respect to the secondary
transmission [of copyrighted works] consisted solely of providing wires,
cables, or other communications channels for the use of others.,,)03 The
advent of the Internet gave rise to even more complex issues regarding
the scope of liability for copyright infringement, for example, whether to
impose liability on certain parties such as system operators who maintain
the network or server that makes it possible for the end-users to access
protected works.)04
As reflected in the legislative history of the DMCA, Congress
determined that appropriate limitations on copyright liability were
important to the development of a robust Internet:
[W]ithout clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate
to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and
capacity of the Internet. In the ordinary course of their operations
service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to
potential copyright infringement liability. For example, service
providers must make innumerable electronic copies by simply

100 Id.
101

Id. at 803.

ld.
103 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12B.0I[A][I](perm.ed., rev.vol. 2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. §111(a)(3)).
104 ld.
102
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transmitting information over the Internet. Certain electronic copies
are made to speed up the delivery of information to users. Other
electronic copies are made in order to host World Wide Web sites.
Many service providers engage in directing users to sites in response
to inquiries by users or they volunteer sites that users may find
attractive. Some of these sites might contain infringing material. In
short, by limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures
that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the
variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to
expand. lOS

One of the ways in which the DMCA sought to appropriately limit
the potential liability of Internet service providers was through the
creation of four "safe harbor" provisions, which protect such entities
from liability under certain highly specified conditions. 106 CC Bill
offered the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to interpret several of the
statutory requirements for Internet companies to qualify for these "safe
harbor" provisions and to clarify the detailed notice requirements under
the statute. 107
A.

SERVICES PROVIDED BY CC BILL AND CAVECREEK WHOLESALE
INTERNET EXCHANGE

The CC Bill case addressed issues related to Perfect 10' s attempt
to recover damages related to the alleged infringement of its copyrights
from defendants responsible for yet another piece of the Internet. The
appellant CC Bill provided a service that allowed consumers to pay for
memberships and subscriptions to e-commerce venues using either credit
cards or checks. 109 Co-appellant Cavecreek Wholesale Internet Exchange
("CWIE") provided webhosting and Internet connectivity services for a
fee to website owners. 110 Perfect 10 asserted that CC Bill and CWIE
clients were infringing its copyrights, and that it began sending letters

105

[d. § 12B.OI [C)[I] (quoting 108 S.Rep. (DMCA), p. 8).

106 Recording

Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229,1234 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
107 Perfect [0 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109-1118. The decision also addressed issues
arising under the Communications Decency Act as well as the appellants direct infringement through
their alleged operation of a website that included altered versions of the copyrighted images. [d. at
1118-1120.
109 [d. at 1108.
110 /d. The services CWIE provided are referred to as "ping, power, and pipe" services, i.e.,
they "ensure that the 'box' or server is on, [that] power is provided to the server and connecting the
client's service or website to the internet via a data center connection." [d.
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and e-mails to the agent designated to receive notice of infringement for
both CC Bill and CWIE more than a year prior to filing suit against them
that informed both companies that their clients were infringing Perfect
10' s copyrights. III

B.

INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS

1.

"Reasonable Implementation" of a Policy to Terminate or Repeat
Blatant Infringers

Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to "comply with
international copyright treaties and to update domestic copyright law for
the online world."ll2 The DMCA includes certain "safe harbor"
provisions that provided "protection from liability for: (1) transitory
digital network communications; (2) system caching; (3) information
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users; and (4)
information location toolS.,,113 To be eligible for anyone of the four safe
harbors, an Internet service provider must meet certain threshold
conditions enumerated in section 512(i), including that the service
provider
has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances
of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
. f'
network wh0 are repeat ill
nngers. 114

The statute failed, however, to define "reasonably implemented."ll5
The Ninth Circuit clarified this provision by holding that "a
service provider 'implements' a policy for purposes of this provision if it
has a working notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCAcomplaint notifications, and if it does not actively prevent copyright
owners from collecting information needed to issue such

1111d.
112 Ellison v. Robertson. 357 F.3d \072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub.L. No 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02[A](perm.ed., rev. vol. 2003); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW
OF INTERNET DISPUTES §6.02 (2002)).
113 Ellison. 357 F.3d at 1076-77 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(a)-(d)).
114 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1109 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

Ilsld.
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notifications." I 16 The court further noted that "[t]he statute permits
service providers to implement a variety of procedures," and that an
implementation will be found "reasonable" if, "under appropriate
circumstances,' the service provider terminates users who repeatedly or
blatantly infringe copyright."lI7
The court readily found that CC Bill "implemented" a policy as
required by the statute, i.e., operating a working notification system,
having a procedure for dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and
not actively preventing copyright owners from collecting information
needed to issue such notifications,118 by maintaining a log that routinely
recorded the email address and/or the name of a webmaster associated
with allegedly infringing websites. 1I9 Since the record below did not
specify whether the defendant failed to adequately respond to bona fide
notices of infringement, the Ninth Circuit, found it necessary to remand
the issue of whether CC Bill "reasonably" implemented its policy by
terminating repeat infringers where appropriate under the statute. 120 The
court determined that Perfect 10' s alleged notifications of the
infringement were inadequate, and therefore did not raise a genuine issue
of material fact that defendants failed to reasonably implement their
policy. 121 The court found the notices were inadequate because they did
not comply with each of the six individual requirements of §512(c)(3). 122

116/d. (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1080; Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,35I F.Supp.2d 1090,
1102-03 (W.D.Wash. 2004); and In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.Supp.2d 634, 659 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
117 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109-1110 (citing 17 U.S.C. §512(i); CorNs Corp,
351 F.Supp.2d at 1102).
118 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1109, 1110.
119 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1110-11. The court distinguished two cases finding
no implementation under this provision. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1075 (finding that AOL did not
reasonably implement its policy against repeat infringers because the email address listed witb the
U.S. Copyright Office was not updated for more than six months, allowing notices of copyright
infringement to "fall into a vacuum and go unheeded."); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252
F.Supp.2d at 659 (finding that Aimster's system of encrypting user information, which rendered it
impossible to ascertain which users were transferring files and infringing copyrights," eviscerate[edl
any hope" that an effective policy under the DMCA could be carried out).
120 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1113, 1115.
121 Id. at 1112-13.
122 Section 501(c)(3) describes the six requirement as follows:

(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a
written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes
substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person autborized to act on behalf of the owner
of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if mUltiple
copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a
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The statute mandates "substantial" compliance with the notice
provisions, which the court interpreted to mean "substantial compliance
with all of §513(c)(3)'s clauses, not just some of them.,,123 Further, the
"DMCA requires that a complainant declare, under penalty of perjury,
that he is authorized to represent the copyright holder, and that he has a
good-faith belief that the user is infringing.,,124 The court found this
requirement to be essential to the statutory scheme:
Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A
user could have content removed, or may have his access terminated
entirely. If the content infringes, justice has been done. But if it does
not, speech protected under the First Amendment could be removed.
We therefore do not require a service provider to start potentially
invasive proceedings if the complainant is unwilling to state under
penalty of perjury that he is an authorized representative of the
copyright owner, and that he has a good-faith belief that the material is
·
d .125
un1lcense
Even though Perfect 10' s notices were inadequate and did not
support its claims, the court remanded to determine whether defendants
"reasonably" implemented their DMCA policy in light of third-party
notices of infringement, and the "red-flag" test of §512(c)(1 )(A)(ii) under
which a service provider may lose immunity if it "fails to take action
with regard to infringing material when it is aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.,,126 Since
application of the safe harbor provisions depended on the reasonable
implementation of a policy, and not on the specific response to the

representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic
mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of
peljury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
17 V.S.C A. § 512(c)(3) (Westlaw 2008).
123 Perfecl 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1112 (emphasis added).
124
ld.
125
126

Id. (emphasis added).
1d. at 1114.
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purported infringement notices of a single party, the district court was
instructed on remand to determine whether third-party notices to
defendants made them "aware that [they were] providing services to
repeat infringers, and if so, whether they responded appropriately.,,127

2.

Additional Safe Harbor Provisions

The court also addressed four even more specific issues arising
under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. First, the court
considered the provision providing that service providers are not entitled
to protection under the safe harbor provisions of §§512(a)-(d) if they
interfere with a statutorily defined range of "standard technical
measures" that are used by copyright owners to protect copyrights on
line. 128 The "standard technical measures" are defined as those that:
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multiindustry standards process;
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms; and
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial
burdens on their systems or networks. 129

Perfect 10 alleged that CC Bill "interfered with standard technical
measures" by blocking Perfect 1O's access to CC Bill affiliated websites
in order to prevent it from discovering whether those websites infringed
its copyrights. 130 The record developed in the district court was not
adequate to permit the Ninth Circuit to determine whether accessing a
website was a "standard technical measure" and, if so, whether CC Bill
interfered with that access. 131 Consequently, the issue was remanded to
develop the record further on this issue. 132
Second, the court considered the safe harbor provision of §512(a)
pertaining to transitory digital network communications. Section 512(a)
provides protection to certain service providers who merely act as
conduits for infringing content. Service providers qualify for this safe
harbor if they are "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or

127

128
129

ld. at 1115.
ld.
Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1115.

130 ld.

ld.
132
1d.
131

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss3/3

22

McFarlane: Copyright Law and the Internet

2008]

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE INTERNET

403

providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing,
without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received." 133
The court noted the importance of this protection to the operation of
the Internet, since information is sent from computer to computer to
computer, each of which makes a short-lived copy, in response to every
individual click on an Internet linkl34 However, the court once again
found a remand was necessary. CC Bill clearly transmitted credit
information and proof of payment, "both of which are 'digital online
communications.''' 135 However, the record did not establish whether
such payment information was transmitted without modification or often
enough to qualify CC Bill as a transient holder. 136 Consequently,
additional fact finding had to be conducted in the court below.
Third, the court examined whether CC Bill qualified for
protection under §512(d), which provides that "A service provider shall
not be liable ... for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity, by using information location tools,
including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link.,,137
The court concluded that, although CC Bill displayed a hyperlink
that could be viewed as an "information location tool" as part of its
transactions, the majority of CC Bill's functions did not fall within this
provision. 138 Consequently, this safe harbor did not apply to immunize
all of CC Bill's activities.
Fourth, the court considered whether CC Bill qualified for the safe
harbor provision under section 512(c) that "limits the liability of
qualifying service providers for claims of direct, vicarious, and
contributory infringement for storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or
for the service provider.,,139 Since Perfect 10's attempted notices of
133Id.1115_16.
l34 ld.
Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC. 488 F.3d at 1115-16.
1d .
137
1d.
138 1d. at 1116-17.
135

136

139 1d. at 1117 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551. at 53 (1998)). A service provider qualifies for
this provision if it meets the requirements of § 512(i) and:

(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on
the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent; or
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infringement to CC Bill were inadequate, the decision turned on whether
the defendant received a direct financial benefit from the infringing
activity and, also, whether it had the right and ability to control the
infringing activity. 140
The court found that "direct financial benefit" under this provision
of the DMCA should be interpreted consistently with the common law
standard for vicarious copyright liability. 141 Under this standard, CC Bill
received a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity only if the
infringing activity represented a "draw for subscribers, not just an added
benefit." 142 Here, Perfect 10 had provided no allegations that the
defendant received such benefit, and the court concluded that this safe
harbor applied, so long as the court found the threshold conditions of
section 512(i) were met. 143
IV. THE PERFECT

10 TRILOGY AND THE ADVANCE OF COPYRIGHT LAW

ON THE INTERNET

Taken together, the Peifect 10 trilogy of cases decided numerous
critical issues regarding the potential liability of companies doing
business through the Internet for infringement arising from individuals
viewing, downloading, and purchasing unauthorized copies of
copyrighted images over the Internet.
Peifect 10 v. Amazon.com narrowed the theories under which an
Internet search engine company could be held liable for direct and
indirect copyright infringement through application of the Ninth Circuit's
server test. Applying this test, the court limited liability for direct
copyright infringement in two significant ways. First, unauthorized
copying of images that are not stored on the search engine company's
own computers, such as those that are reproduced on a user's computer
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or
to be the subject of infringing activity.
17 U.S.C.A. 512(c)(I) (Westlaw 2008).
140 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1117.
141 [d. (citing the "well established rule of construction that where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress meant to incorporate the established meaning of these terms."
(citations and quotations omitted)).
142 [d. (citing Ellison,357 F.3d at 1079).
143 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill LLC, 488 F.3d at 1117.
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through in-line-linking, does not give rise to liability for direct
infringement. Second, liability for storing "thumbnail" images on the
search engine company's servers is limited by the likelihood that a fair
use defense will prevail due to the fundamentally transformative nature
of those embodiments.
The case also rejected the theory that operation of a search engine
gave rise to liability for vicarious infringement because the search engine
company did not have the power to "control" the infringement. Finally,
the decision limited the search engine company's liability for
contributory infringement to those cases where it had knowledge that the
infringing images were available using its search engine, it could take
simple measures to prevent further damage to the copyright owner's
copyrighted works, and, nonetheless, failed to take such steps.
Perfect 10 v. Visa International Serv Assn clearly teaches that
financial institutions whose payment systems are used to process fees
paid for pirated copies of copyrighted images are not liable for the direct
infringement, thereby declining Perfect 10' s request to make them the de
facto police force of the Internet charged with preventing on line
copyright abuses. Finally, Perfect 10 v. CC Bill provides valuable
guidance pertaining to the safe harbor and notice provisions of the
DMCA. Each of these far-reaching decisions represents important
developments in the law governing protection of intellectual property in
the evolving landscape of the Internet.
While these decisions addressed novel issues, Amazon.com and
Visa, in particular, can be viewed as extensions of legal principles that
have guided copyright law throughout its history and as faithful
applications of important policy considerations. Both of these cases
balance the copyright protections granted to content creators against the
public interest in unfettered access to information and ideas.
The monopoly granted to copyright holders has never been
absolute. "From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity
for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose . . ." 144 Copyright protection was enshrined in
the Constitution to advance the arts and sciences, and doctrines such as
the fair use defense developed to "permit [and in fact require] courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statue when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster.,,145
Thus, the reasoned limitations on liability set forth in Amazon.com and
Visa are consistent with the long-standing policy of copyright.

144

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994).
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990».

145/d.
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These decisions are also consistent with the public policy goals
Congress more recently announced in relation to the Internet. 146 As
stated by the majority opinion in Visa, federal policy specifically
encourages promotion of the Internet and the minimization of
governmental intrusion in the medium. Indeed, the court specifically
stated that it would review Perfect lO's claim in the context of the
"policy of the United States--(l) to promote the continued development
of the Internet ... [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet ... , unfettered by Federal or
State regulation." 147 The court noted similar policy statements made
during passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, one of the
stated purposes of which was to "facilitate the robust development and
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications,
research, development, and education in the digital age.,,148 Clearly, the
court saw its holding, which encourages access to images over the
Internet, as consistent with these directives. 149
Finally, these cases represent an instructive example of courts
grappling to apply intellectual property laws to cases of potential
infringement that involve technologies that did not exist when the
applicable statutes were enacted and the leading cases were published.
The majority in the Visa case'believed that the issues raised by applying
copyright to images on the Internet were fundamentally different from
those existing in the pre-digital age, and dismissed certain older cases as
outmoded. 150 The Visa majority saw these cases as providing little if any
guidance applicable to the infringement issues before them:

146 See e.g., Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 794 (quoting 47 U.S.c.
§§230(b)(1), (2)) and 788, n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998)) .
147 Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 794 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§§230(b)(I), (2)).
148 Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 788, n.2 (quoting S. REP. NO.
105-190, at 1-2 (1998)).
149 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 797. While, the court noted this policy
interest, it was not strictly necessary to its holding, which was squarely rooted in precedent
interpreting the Copyright Act itself.
150 One line of these older cases held that absentee landlords who lacked knowledge of
infringing acts of their tenants and who exercised no control over the leased premises were not liable
for infringing acts committed by their tenants on their premises. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98
F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938). The second line of cases held that "the operator of an entertainment
venue was held liable only for infringing performances when the operator (I) could control the
premises, and (2) obtained a direct financial benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the
infringing performance."Fonovisa,76 F.3d at 262 (citing Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. 283 U.S.
191 (1931) and Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. V. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1929)).
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The[ tests developed in those cases] were developed for a brick-andmortar world, and, as the Napster and Grokster courts implicitly
recognized by paying little attention to them, they do not lend
themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context. In
deciding this case, we are well-advised to follow the lead of the
Supreme Court's and our own court's cases confronting online
commerce. 151

Judge Kozinski, in his dissent, strongly disagreed with this technological
distinction.
It is true that these cases were developed in a brick and mortar world,

but the distinction they draw between those who materially assist
infringement (and are therefore liable) and those who are more
remotely involved (and are therefore not liable) is equally important-perhaps even more important--in cyberspace than in real space. That
Napster and Grokster did not consider these cases is hardly
significant. The defendants there were centrally involved in the
infringing transactions--indeed, as the majority reminds us, their
systems were created solely to promote infringement, [citation] --and
thus there could be no argument that their involvement in the
infringing transactions was too peripheral to give rise to a claim of
. froIOgement. 152
secon dary 10

Despite this spirited disagreement, the Ninth Circuit's decisions
discussed in the article do not, in the end, turn on the nature of the
technology involved. To the contrary, these cases are firmly grounded in
fundamental principles of copyright law and apply the controlling rules
faithfully to the new technologies raised in these cases. While there may
be room for disagreement with its ultimate holdings, the court was not
unduly swayed by technology, and, in the end, the decisions are rooted in
firmly established principles of direct and indirect copyright
infringement that were formulated independent of the Internet and that
have been adapted to address the challenges of cyberspace.

151
152

Perfect 10 v. Visa International Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 798. n.9.
1d. at 816. n. 10 (Kozinski. J.• dissenting) (citation omitted).
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